

In the past few years <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ spate of publications has lent fuel to the fires of interest in intelligence and specifically <sup>contribution of the code breakers</sup> the work of ~~intelligence~~ in World War II. Some of the <sup>books</sup> publications are David Kahn's, "The Code Breakers", Group <sup>Captain's Winton</sup> ~~captains Winton-~~ <sup>Bottom's</sup> ~~bottoms~~, "Ultra", and The Bodyguard of Lies by Cave Brown. As a result of these <sup>books</sup> ~~publications~~ and stimulation of <sup>the</sup> interest of historians a question which is frequently asked is, "What part did radio intelligence <sup>code breaking</sup> or, more specifically ~~ULTRA~~ play in the strategic decisions ~~of~~ controlling World War II as it was fought in North Africa, Italy, and ~~the~~ ~~European~~ ~~theater~~ ~~of~~ ~~operations~~."

Obviously, for the historian at least, if it can be determined <sup>radio intelligence or code breaking supplying information for</sup> that ~~Ultra~~ played a significant part in ~~these~~ strategic decisions then much of what we currently know <sup>the</sup> ~~as~~ history of World War WI and its major <sup>decisions and</sup> battles and decisions needs to be re-evaluated in light of the role played by <sup>this information which</sup> ~~Ultra or ultra~~ intelligence <sup>the knowledge of which has heretofore been suppressed.</sup>

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In December of 1976 the American Historical Association held its annual meeting. One of the seminars presented in that meeting dealt with codebreaking and intelligence in the European Theater in World War II. That session was chaired by Arthur L. Bank, and a major paper, "The Significance of Code Breaking and Intelligence in Allied Strategy and Tactics," was presented by

David Kahn. Comment on ~~the~~ Mr. Kahns paper was presented by Telford Taylor, Dr. Harold C. Deutch, and Jürgen Rowher. Rowher also presented an additional paper on the effect of codebreaking on German submarine warfare. It was concluded by that forum

that the role of code breaking in intelligence in the European Theater during World War II was not of significance to dictate the ~~necessity for~~ rewriting the various histories of the War.

One of the participants of the panel, Telford Taylor, had much greater direct knowledge of the effect of code breaking on the War than did any of the other participants. Telford Taylor, later Brigadier General Taylor, began an association with the Special Intelligence Branch of the War Department General Staff in 1942 after an earlier distinguished career as a lawyer with various ~~various~~ government organizations and agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission. The seminar which was earlier mentioned was attended by a number of National Security Agency and the presence of General Taylor excited considerable interest in the seminar and planted the seed for further consultation with the General on the role of ~~the~~ in World War II.

Consequently,

*Handwritten notes:*  
 - *in the European Theater* (written vertically on the right margin)  
 - *Mr. Rowher* (written above Rowher)  
 - *Enigma* (written above codebreaking)  
 - *by the British at the US* (written above on German submarine warfare)  
 - *and* (written above in intelligence)  
 - *such as* (written above significance)  
 - *so* (written above rewriting)  
 - *by virtue of his World War II experience* (written vertically on the right margin)  
 - *government organization as* (written above various various departments)  
 - *personal* (written above and the)  
 - *and* (written above and considerable interest)  
 - *and illumination of* (written vertically on the right margin)  
 - *Generals - in intelligence and operations with Ultra* (written above General on the role)  
 - *of the* (written above in World War II)

on April 7, 1977, Genral Taylor with an old friend Brigader Tiltman, UK Army, ~~was asked to~~ <sup>ed</sup> present a commentary <sup>of NSA</sup> on the origins, organization, and use of Ultra with the <sup>British and</sup> United States Forces in the ~~Eu~~ropean Theater during World War II. <sup>P</sup> General Tiltman presented preliminary remarks to the commentary by Genral Taylor based on his earlier experiences with Ultra or the ~~ENIGMA~~ Enigma. It is also notable that ~~attended~~ <sup>among</sup> individuals attending the commentary were former members of the US Army who had participated at Bletchley Park in Hut Six ~~on~~ the examination and decryption of traffic enciphered in ~~the~~ Enigma by the German forces. ~~Brigader Tiltman provided~~ ~~background~~ in providing background for General Taylors remarks described the Government Code and Cipher School and its fo~~u~~-mation in 1920 <sup>by the British</sup> from the Navy Cryptanalytic Section 40 OB. Commander, later Sir Edwin ~~Heath~~ Travis, of Travis Trophy fame, <sup>was one of us who</sup> ~~became~~ <sup>came</sup> chief <sup>at</sup> ~~at~~ Bletchley Park. <sup>Bletchley Park</sup> was largely concerned with the military side of things. The largest part of the <sup>BP</sup> effort was devoted to the solution of Enigma. <sup>The</sup> breaking of Enigma key for Army and Air was carried out in Hut Six, while the Navy was done in Hut Eight. What was derived from the decrypted text was handled in Hut Three. Brigader Tiltman described <sup>in his memoirs</sup> two notable events, the arrival of the large US Army contingent in 1943, <sup>for work in Hut Six</sup> and the earlier visit of Sinkov, and Rosen of the Army, and Currier and Weeks, <sup>of the Navy OP 20G</sup> ~~from the~~ Navy who arrived bringing the solution <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ the Japanese PURPLE machine.

*was then spent*

~~Spending~~ a couple of months with the British at Bletchley Park a few months <sup>before</sup> Pearl Harbor making " a magnificent gesture of cooperation". According to Brigader Tiltman, it was sometime before the British would reciprocate by giving the solution of the Enigma to the US. Their hesitation was primarily based on the fear of loss of the valuable intelligence source.

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General Taylor dates his association with Special Intelligence Branch from about October 1942 to June 1945. By way of preliminary qualifications General Taylor ~~was~~ <sup>described as an association</sup> with the Federal Communications Commission as the General Counsel in his last assignment before joining Special Branch <sup>also was</sup>. He had some contact with communications through organizations like the Federal Broadcast Monitoring Service <sup>of the FCC</sup> which intercepted foreign broadcasts and prepared analyses of those broadcasts. He also served on the Law Committee of the Defense Communications Board, later the War Communications Board. He was aware <sup>thus</sup> in March 1942 ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> the Special Branch <sup>quite</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> composed <sup>of</sup> mostly lawyers of his acquaintance. <sup>PP</sup> ~~Mr.~~ <sup>According to General</sup> Stimson and his deputy <sup>Secretary of War</sup> Mr. McCloy, decided after Pearl Harbor that more advantage had <sup>been</sup> ~~to be~~ taken of the material being received from Arlington Hall. <sup>Some warning would have been ordered</sup> In order to achieve an organization which would assist in obtaining <sup>the better advantage,</sup> ~~those goals,~~ Mr. McCloy's law partner ~~was~~, Mr. McCormick, was invited to Washington to study the situation. After a few months, <sup>Mr McCormick recommended to be</sup> Mr. McCloy agreed that the best solution was an expanded Special Branch <sup>Capable of intelligence analysis.</sup>. The officer in-

*Charge*

was Colonel Carter Clarke, a Regular Army officer of long standing and Al McCormick acting as his deputy who had also been commissioned as a ~~Colonel~~ *Colonel* ~~General Taylor~~ *General Taylor* Carter Clarke, and Mr. McCormick

*bed fellows*  
a strange pair. Carter Clarke was described as a hard-nosed army officer who "knew where the bodies were buried", and was very organized. McCormick on the other hand had a way of with words and much presence *from his Wall Street law practice* and was able to spend considerable amount of time working on preparation of the intelligence summaries which presented materials from Arlington Hall. Mr.

McCormick in his studies <sup>y</sup> of the information being furnished *has personally* that included the basic problem was the lack of analysis of the information. Intercept was literally furnished on a message text basis and no attempt <sup>e</sup> was made to relate or fuse the information *from* the various messages with each other, or with other information. And worse, from *Col McCormick's* viewpoint, *of the Special*

*Branch* the information received from Arlington Hall was distributed from a source that had no prestige <sup>and</sup> or carried little weight <sup>with the *operational elements*</sup> of the War Department. Mr. McCormick ~~said~~ *set* about acquiring the

prestige and performing the analysis and summations of the materials. These summaries came to be known as "MAGIC". Of course the summaries at this point were exclusively based on Japanese diplomatic traffic. *P* General Taylor described officers of the Special Intelligence Branch as ignorant of Arlington Hall and its activities and clearly the most salient point to be made about the then active situation was the enormous amount of jealousy which existed between various segments of the Army

*War Department*

the Army and the Navy, and other ~~entities~~ <sup>organizations</sup> associated with intelligence. In illustration of the sort of difficulty which existed between services, General Taylor described his assignment by ~~XXXXXX~~ Colonel Clarke to discover the "real" ~~XXXXXX~~ details of the Savo Island engagement between the Japanese, Australians, and American forces in the Pacific. After analysis of the various press communiques, he was able to determine that the US fleet had been sunk one and a half times, while the Japanese had been sunck three times. This delighted Colonel Clarke since it proved the lack of factual information and thereafter <sup>the then</sup> Major Taylor's reputation was made. It was shortly after this that his assignment to England to study the English <sup>operation</sup> work was made shortly after New Years Day in 1943. <sup>PP</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>From then until</sup> March of 1943, Major Taylor spent the time familiarizing himself with the activites going on at Arlington Hall. Not to become and <sup>to develop</sup> analyst but ~~to have~~ an appreciation of the sort of work which went into the analysis of codes and ciphers. In April of 1943, General Taylor, William Friedman, and Al McCormick <sup>went</sup> ~~went~~ to England for the purpose of establishing <sup>closer</sup> liaison and ~~exchanging~~ <sup>working</sup> technical information ~~on a closer basis~~. Initially, a rather full orientation <sup>as shown to</sup> ~~was accomplished by~~ the three. After ~~three~~ <sup>three</sup> full weeks of orientation it was decided that Taylor would remain in England where he would be given full <sup>access</sup> ~~access~~ to British materials being produced ~~and he would then~~ and he would then prepared the necessary analysis <sup>and</sup> send a commentary to Washington. <sup>T</sup> Taylor was soon joined Reginald Randolph who

took over the task of analyzing traffic at Berkley Street whereupon Taylor then went out to Bletchley Park and from then until the Spring of 1944 the main task of the American unit in Hut Three and at ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Berkly Street was to feed Washington with intelligence materials. *Hut three was augmented with* A need also arose

~~and resulted in the supply of American officers who spoke German.~~ *assist* to the Hut Three operation. *the* *The*

*Chief of Radio Intelligence in Europe* At the same time, Colonel Beecher and the Arlington Hall boys arranged to have a detachment of Americans join at BP under Major William Bundy to work in Hut Six. *in engine analysis* The main lesson *mel* learned by Col McCormick and General Taylor while at

BP was the enormous amount of work involved in producing the information on which intelligence ~~reports were~~ *was based* the intelligence ~~needed from traffic intercepted.~~ Much credit in the production

of intelligence ~~from the analysis going on in Hut Six~~ was due to the "backroom boys" who for example, helped in *alter of code* the reading of certain messsges by producing the right ~~xxxx~~ grid information *for a translation key of the text.* for an understanding/ At the same time some attention was payed

to intelligence vslue of messages which had previously been encrypted in the enornous flow of information from Hut Six and some decisions were made *the* *study was needed* on priorities. By the spring of 44

it was evident that there was going to be a considerably larger ~~xxxx~~ number of headquarters requiring Ultra than heretofore. A

fact which made distribution correspondingly difficult was that all of the ~~distribution~~ *British* for the Army/Air Force was on a direct basis. Distribution in the case of the British went to officers




who had formerly served at BP to an Army and <sup>A</sup>ir force level. They were use to that type of information and were aware of the certification of the information. The Americans on the other hand had not the same corps of officers and were un- aware of the source of the intelligence, <sup>my</sup> and generally lacked knowledge of the authenticity of Ultra information. Consequently, <sup>a</sup>the decision was taken after consultation with the War Department, to have <sup>an</sup> officers assigned to each major US army and air force ~~a special intelligence officer~~ whose job it would be to brief the commander and his deputy and ~~the~~ G-2 on intelligence and to make sure that it did not sink into the swamp and that <sup>the Ultra information</sup> ~~it~~ was handled with <sup>absolute</sup> security. The decision to place officers at each of the major commands of the ~~American~~ Forces to handle ULtra resulted in a steady flow of officers both from the United States and England who were briefed on the various aspects of Ultra and its safety and <sup>accuracy</sup> <sup>agreements</sup> handling. It was <sup>at</sup> this point Taylor recalls that he met Winterbottom who performed the same functions <sup>of control for Ultra</sup> on the British side.

~~★~~ Genral Taylor remarked on the point of whether Ultra had contributed to winning the War that he personally could not think of any single incident in which it made a strategic difference. He concluded that Ultra ~~that~~ had two significant values; the first was that it was of great value defensively, and the second was served as a major lubricant in the decision process. He also judged that the greater outpouring of Ultra information



came after the Germans had lost the strategic<sup>is</sup> and tactical  
advantage. In extension <sup>in Europe</sup> "lubricant" thesis <sup>of the</sup>, General

Taylor called to mind the use of Ultra in various cover  
plans and his strong conviction that if it had not been for

Ultra intelligence the Battle of the Atlantic would have been  
a much closer thing than it was! 

General Taylor concluded that while no single event could  
be pointed to with any certainty as having been resolved

because of Ultra it certainly had made a <sup>general</sup> contribution  
to much of the course of the War and had served <sup>very</sup> a useful purpose.